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DCI/ICS 78-1207  
30 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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FROM: [redacted]  
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Tactical Intelligence Support in Europe [redacted]

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1. [redacted] Action Requested: None; for information only.

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2. [redacted] Background:

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a. One of my officers working full-time on the National/Tactical Interface issue, [redacted], recently completed a swing through the European theater and component intelligence staffs. His observations on NATO-induced problems are quite interesting. In the past, USAREUR/7th Army has focused on and identified with Central Army Group. With the deployment of a U.S. brigade to northern Germany and the planning for a cadre U.S. Corps in that area, their perspective is perforce drastically widened to include Northern Army Group. In turn, the need to deal with two army groups also forces attention on the next higher echelon, Allied Forces Central Europe. The changes in command and support relationships which this implies are complex and the various American headquarters are struggling to come to grips with them.

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b. [redacted] Concerning intelligence support, [redacted] found U.S. commands to be intensely aware that everywhere on their flanks are allied units who cannot base their operational planning and decision-making on the same intelligence as do U.S. units. Considerable frustration and anxiety were expressed to him in regard to restrictions on release to NATO, the cumbersomeness (slow and manpower intensive) of sanitization, communications difficulties, and the limited ability of allied units to absorb/exploit intelligence even if the first two problems were solved; e.g., the G-2 section of the 12th Panzer Division has only three officers assigned. He was told that this reflects a difference of tactical intelligence philosophy between

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U.S. and German forces--the latter focusing on centralized analysis and pushing finished product forward, as opposed to our favoring localized capabilities for the full intelligence cycle, to include a capability to select/edit/ format raw, semi-raw, and finished products from higher echelons.


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c.  He also encountered universal condemnation of the notion that opening the floodgates when the shooting starts represents any kind of solution at all. Each of the headquarters visited felt very strongly that chaos would ensue if allied formations did not gain facility with all-source intelligence which can only come with peacetime practice. American ground formations in central Europe must anchor their flanks on an ally, and in the confusion of battle they do not want to be in a position of asking that ally to "trust me" regarding a decision based on intelligence which is unfamiliar or cannot be revealed.

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d.  Ambassador Komer, Adviser on NATO Affairs to Secretary Brown, expressed the same concerns in the course of a DSARC II on the Army's SOTAS (Standoff Target Acquisition System) which I attended on August 4, 1978.

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